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Abstract In this paper, we introduce Saber, a package of cryptographic
primitives whose security relies on the hardness of the Module Learning
With Rounding problem (Mod-LWR). We first describe a secure Diffie-
Hellman type key exchange protocol, which is then transformed into an
IND-CPA encryption scheme and finally into an IND-CCA secure key
encapsulation mechanism using a post-quantum version of the Fujisaki-
Okamoto transform. The design goals of this package were simplicity,
efficiency and flexibility resulting in the following choices: all integer
moduli are powers of 2 avoiding modular reduction and rejection sam-
pling entirely; the use of LWR halves the amount of randomness re-
quired compared to LWE-based schemes and reduces bandwidth; the
module structure provides flexibility by reusing one core component for
multiple security levels. A constant-time AVX2 optimized software im-
plementation of the KEM with parameters providing more than 128 bits
of post-quantum security, requires only 101K, 125K and 129K cycles for
key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation respectively on a Dell
laptop with an Intel i7-Haswell processor.
1 Introduction
The threat of quantum computers, which break most widely used public key
cryptographic primitives, has sparked a rising interest in post-quantum cryp-
tography. This is emphasized by organizations such as ETSI and NIST that
are looking towards standardization of post-quantum cryptography [19]. Lattice
based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates that are resilient to
all known quantum attacks. Examples include NTRU based schemes [29,45,11]
and protocols based on the (ring)-Learning With Errors (LWE) problem: Alkim
et al. [4] presented ‘A New Hope’, based on the ring-LWE problem; Bos et al. [17]
introduced an alternative scheme called ‘Frodo’ based solely on LWE, but suffers
from higher bandwidth and computational complexity; Bhattacharya et al. [12]
improved upon the bandwidth of ‘Frodo’, by basing their protocol on LWR whilst
still avoiding the use of rings; Bos et al. [16] presented a CCA-secure Mod-LWE
based key exchange called ‘Kyber’ which takes the middle road between ‘Frodo’
and ’a New Hope’ by using modules. Concurrently to our work, Jin et al. de-
scribed a generic key exchange for Ring-LWE, Mod-LWE, LWE and LWR in [33],
and Baan et al. [8] described a LWR, Ring-LWR key exchange.
In this paper, we introduce Saber, a suite of cryptographic primitives based
on the Mod-LWR problem. The choices we made for the underlying hard prob-
lem and also the actual parameters of the scheme were motivated by three design
principles: simplicity of the scheme and its implementation, efficiency and flexi-
bility:
– Learning with Rounding (LWR) [10]: schemes based on (variants of) LWE
require sampling from noise distributions, which needs randomness. Further-
more, the noise is included in public keys and ciphertexts resulting in higher
bandwidth. LWR based schemes naturally reduce the bandwidth while avoid-
ing additional randomness for the noise since it is deterministically obtained.
– Choice of moduli: we choose all integer moduli in the scheme to be powers of
2. This eliminates the need for explicit modular reduction and complicated
sampling routines such as rejection sampling. We also prove that using pow-
ers of two, the keys are unbiased and that there is no need for steps such
as uplifting and randomization or decoding of the exchanged information.
These advantages contribute to the simplicity of our design, and facilitate
constant time implementations. The main disadvantage of using such mod-
uli is that it excludes the use of the number theoretic transform (NTT) to
speed up polynomial multiplication. We propose the use of a combination
of Toom-Cook and Karatsuba polynomial multiplication to mitigate this
disadvantage.
– Modules [36,16]: the module versions of the problems (see Section 2) allow
to interpolate between the original pure LWE/LWR problems and their ring
versions, lowering computational complexity and bandwidth compared to
LWE/LWR, while introducing protection against attacks on the ring struc-
ture of Ring-LWE/LWR and flexibility to move to higher security levels
without any need to change the underlying arithmetic.
A high-level constant-time software implementation of Saber is provided and
has been placed in the public domain1 as part of the submission to the NIST
competition. The implementation has been optimized using AVX2 instructions
available in modern Intel processors and uses a combination of Toom-Cook and
Karatsuba polynomial multiplication algorithms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we review
the necessary background; we present a secure Diffie-Hellman type key exchange
scheme in Section 3, a CPA secure encryption scheme in Section 4 and a CCA
secure key encapsulation mechanism in Section 5. A security analysis of the
hardness on the underlying mod-LWR problem is given in Section 6.1, based on
which three parameter sets are chosen in Section 6.2. Finally, specific implemen-
tation choices that speed up our protocols are discussed in Section 7 and our
implementation results are compared with the state of the art in Section 8.
1 Source codes available at https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/SABER
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We denote with Zq the ring of integers modulo an integer q with representants in
[0, q) and for an integer z, we denote z mod q the reduction of z in [0, q). Rq is the
quotient ring Zq[X]/(Xn + 1) with n a fixed power of 2 (we only need n = 256).
For any ring R, Rl×k denotes the ring of l × k-matrices over R. For p | q, the
mod p operator is extended to (matrices over) Rq by applying it coefficient-wise.
Single polynomials are written without markup, vectors are bold lower case and
matrices are denoted with bold upper case. U denotes the uniform distribution
and βµ is a centered binomial distribution with parameter µ and corresponding
standard deviation σ =
√
µ/2. If χ is a probability distribution over a set S,
then x ← χ denotes sampling x ∈ S according to χ. If χ is defined on Zq,
X ← χ(Rl×kq ) denotes sampling the matrix X ∈ Rl×kq , where all coefficients of
the entries in X are sampled from χ.
We use the part selection function bits(x, i, j) with j ≤ i to access j con-
secutive bits of a positive integer x ending at the i-th index (assuming least
significant bit in the 0-th index), producing an integer in Z2j ; i.e., written in
standard C code the function returns (x  (i − j))&(2j − 1), where  is the
right-shift operator. This is explained in Fig. 1.The part selection function is
extended to polynomials and matrices by applying it coefficient-wise. Finally let
be denote rounding to the nearest integer, which can be extended to polynomials
and matrices coefficient-wise.
i 0
LSBMSB j
Figure 1: The bits(x, i, j) operator.
2.2 Cryptographic definitions
Let KE be a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange protocol between two parties as
illustrated in Protocol 1. KE is called (1 − δ)-correct if after execution of the
protocol Pr[k′ = k] > 1− δ, where the probability is computed over the random
coins used in Protocol 1. KE is called IND-RND secure if it is hard for an
adversary to distinguish the real shared secret from random. More formally, we
define the advantage of an adversary in distinguishing the key k from a uniformly
random key kˆ ← U(K) as follows:
Advind-rndKE (A) =
∣∣∣Pr[A(P,A,B, k) = 1]− Pr[A(P,A,B, kˆ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
A public key encryption scheme consists of a triple of functions PKE =
(KeyGen, Enc, Dec), where KeyGen returns a secret key sk and a public key pk;
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Public parameters P
Alice Bob
Choose secret a
Compute A as function of P and a A - Choose secret b
Compute B as function of P and b
ﬀ B
k = Derive key from P, a,B k′ = Derive key from P, b,A
Protocol 1: Diffie-Hellman type key exchange protocol
Enc takes a public key pk and a message m ∈M to produce a ciphertext c ∈ C,
and Dec takes the secret key sk together with ciphertext c to output a message
m′ ∈ M or the symbol ⊥ to denote rejection. The PKE is said to be (1 − δ)-
correct if Pr[Dec(sk, Enc(pk,m)) = m] > 1 − δ, where the probability is taken
over (pk, sk) ← KeyGen and the random coins of Enc. We use the notion of
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and define the
advantage of an adversary A by:
Advind-cpaenc (A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b′ = b : (pk, sk)← KeyGen();(m1,m2)← AEnc(pk); b← U({0, 1});
c← Enc(pk,mb); b′ ← AEnc(pk, c);
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The weaker notion of one-wayness under chosen plaintext attacks (OW-CPA) is
defined as:
Advow-cpaenc (A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
m′ = m : (pk, sk)← KeyGen();m←M; c← Enc(pk,m);
m′ ← AEnc(pk, c);
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
A key-encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KeyGen, Encaps, Decaps) is a triple
of probabilistic algorithms, where KeyGen returns a secret key sk and a public
key pk, where Encaps takes a public key pk and produces a ciphertext c and a
key k ∈ K, and where Decaps takes the secret key sk, the public key pk and
ciphertext c to return a key k ∈ K or the symbol ⊥ to denote rejection. The KEM
is said to be (1−δ)-correct if Pr[Decaps(sk, c) = k : (c, k)← Encaps(pk)] > 1−δ,
where the probability is taken over (pk, sk)← KeyGen and the random coins of
Encaps. We use the notion of indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA) to define the advantage of an adversary A by:
Advind-ccaKEM (A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b′ = b : (pk, sk)← KeyGen(); b← U({0, 1});(c, d, k0)← Encaps(pk);
k1 ← K; b′ ← ADecaps(pk, c, d, kb);
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing a pseudorandom generator
gen() with seed seedA ← U({0, 1}256) from a uniformly random distribution is
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defined as follows:
Advprg
gen()(A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
[
b′ = 1 :
seedA ← U({0, 1}256)
A ← gen(seedA) ∈ Rl×lq ; b′ = A(A);
]
.
−Pr [b′ = 1 : A ← U(Rm×lq ); b′ = A(A); ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
2.3 LWE, LWR and Mod-LWR problems
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [41] and its
decisional version states that it is hard to distinguish uniform random samples
(a, u)← U(Zl×1q × Zq) from LWE-samples of the form(
a, b = aTs + e
)
∈ Zl×1q × Zq , (2)
where the secret vector s ← βµ(Zl×1q ) is fixed for all samples, a ← U(Zl×1q )
and e ← βµ(Zq) is a small error. A module version of LWE, called Mod-LWE,
was analyzed by Langlois and Stehle´ [36] and essentially replaces the ring Zq in
the above samples by a quotient ring of the form Rq with corresponding error
distribution βµ(R
l×1
q ). The rank of the module is l and the dimension of the ring
Rq is n. The case l = 1 corresponds to the ring-LWE problem introduced in [37].
The LWR problem was introduced by Banerjee et al. [10] and is a derandom-
ized version of the LWE problem. In contrast to the LWE problem, the “noise”
in the LWR problem is generated deterministically by scaling and rounding co-
efficients modulo q to modulo p (with p < q). In detail, an LWR sample is given
by (
a, b =
⌊p
q
(aTs)
⌉)
∈ Zl×1q × Zp (3)
for a fixed s ← βµ(Zl×1q ) and uniform random a ← U(Zl×1q ). The decisional LWR
problem states that is it hard to distinguish samples from the LWR distribution
from that of the uniform distribution. A reduction from the LWE problem to
the LWR problem was given by Banerjee et al. [10], and further improved by
Alwen et al. [6], Bogdanov et al. [15] and, Alperin-Sheriff and Daniel Apon [5].
The security of our protocol relies on the hardness of the module version of
LWR (Mod-LWR), which is a straightforward generalization of Mod-LWE. A
Mod-LWR sample is given by(
a, b =
⌊p
q
(aTs)
⌉)
∈ Rl×1q ×Rp (4)
where the secret s ← βµ(Rl×1q ) is fixed for all samples and a ← U(Rl×1q ).
The advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing m samples from a Mod-
LWR distribution from that of a uniform distribution is defined as follows, where
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m, k, µ, q and p are positive integers with q > p:
AdvMod-LWRm,l,µ,q,p (A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
(
b′ = 1 :
A ← U(Rm×lq ); s ← βµ(Rl×1q );
b′ = A(A, b(p/q)Ase);
)
−Pr
(
b′ = 1 :
A ← U(Rm×lq ); u ← U(Rl×1p );
b′ = A(A,u);
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5)
3 Key Exchange
In Protocol 2 we describe a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange scheme Saber.KE
based on the hardness of Mod-LWR problem. Unlike the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [23], in our scheme the two communicating parties sometimes fail to
agree on the same key. As in previous works [24,40,12], we can make this failure
probability negligibly small by sending some additional reconciliation data c.
Alice Bob
1 seedA ← U({0, 1}256)
2 A ← gen(seedA) ∈ Rl×lq
3 s ← βµ(Rl×1q ) s′ ← βµ(Rl×1q )
4 b = bits(As + h, q, p) ∈ Rl×1p b, seedA- A ← gen(seedA) ∈ Rl×lq
5 b′ = bits(ATs′ + h, q, p) ∈ Rl×1p
6 v′ = bT bits(s′, p, p) + h1 ∈ Rp
7 v = b′T bits(s, p, p) + h1 ∈ Rp ﬀb
′, c c = bits(v′, p − 1, t) ∈ Rt
8 k = bits(v − 2p−t−1c+ h2, p, 1) k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9 keyAlice = kdf(k) keyBob = kdf(k
′)
Protocol 2: Saber.KE key exchange
All moduli involved in the scheme are chosen to be powers of 2, in particular
we choose q = 2q , p = 2p and t = 2t with q > p > (t+1), so we have 2t | p | q.
In practice, our main parameter set will correspond to the case q = 13, p = 10
and t = 3. The secret vectors s and s
′ are sampled from βµ(Rl×1q ), with µ < p,
while the matrix A ∈ Rl×lq is sampled using a pseudorandom generator gen()
initialized with seedA. The session key is obtained by feeding the common secret
k = k′ ∈ R2 into a key derivation function kdf(). The algorithm also uses three
constants: a constant vector h ∈ Rl×1q consisting of polynomials all coefficients
of which are set to the constant 2q−p−1, a constant polynomial h1 ∈ Rq with
all coefficients equal to 2q−p−1, and a constant polynomial h2 ∈ Rq with all
coefficients set equal to (2p−2 − 2p−t−2). These constants are used to mimic
rounding operations, which are necessary to reduce failure probability, while
retaining the reduction to the underlying decisional Mod-LWR problem.
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Note that the operations bits(s, p, p) in line 6 and bits(s
′, p, p) in line 7
simply mean we are considering s mod p and s′ mod p as elements in Rp which
is well defined since p | q.
Correctness: Using Saber.KE two communicating parties agree on a com-
mon random key with overwhelming probability. A tight bound on the failure
probability can be obtained using following observations from Bos et al. [17]: the
reconciliation between two integer values vi, v
′
i ∈ Zp is correct if the distance
between vi and v
′
i is smaller than p/4(1− 1/t), and fails if the distance is bigger
than p/4(1 + 1/t). In between these values, the probability of success decreases
linearly from 1 to 0. Consequently, a tight bound on the failure probability given
the distribution of ∆vi = v
′
i − vi can be calculated by adding to ∆vi a discrete
uniformly distributed error er ∈ Zp with range [−p/4t, p/4t]. The success prob-
ability of the reconciliation between vi and v
′
i then equals Pr[|∆vi + er| < p/4].
Using the above observation we can estimate a bound on the error probability:
Theorem 1. Let A be a matrix in Rl×lq and s,s
′ two vectors in Rl×1q sampled
as in Protocol 2. Define e and e′ as the rounding errors introduced by scaling
and rounding As and ATs′, i.e. bits(As+h, q, p) = pqAs+e and bits(A
Ts′+
h, q, p) =
p
qA
Ts′ + e′ . Let er ∈ Rq be a polynomial with uniformly distributed
coefficients with range [−p/4t, p/4t]. If we set
δ = Pr[||(s′Te − e′Ts + er) mod p||∞ > p/4]
then after executing the Saber.KE protocol, both communicating parties agree on
a n-bit key with probability 1− δ.
Proof. The polynomials v′ and v calculated by Bob and Alice respectively in
Protocol 2 are given as: v′ = (pqs
′TAs+h1+s′Te mod p) and v = (pqs
′TAs+h1+
e′Ts mod p). Here, the coefficients of e,e′ are the rounding errors and so are in
(−1/2, 1/2]. It can be easily seen that the values calculated by the communicating
parties differ by ∆v = ||(s′Te − e′Ts) mod p||. Therefore, Bob and Alice agree
on the same secret if ||∆v + er||∞ ≤ p4 . Hence, for δ = Pr[||(s′Te − e′Ts + er)
mod p||∞ > p/4] the Saber.KE protocol is (1− δ) correct.
Similar to Bos et al. [16], a tight upper bound on the value of δ is calculated
using a Python script. To be able to practically compute the distribution of
∆v = v′ − v ∈ Rp, Bos et al. assume independence between the terms s′Te
and e′Ts, which is not necessarily the case. Analogous to Theorem 5.2 from
Jin and Zhao [33], one could argue that they are independent if conditioned
on s′TAs ≡ a mod q/p, where a ∈ Rq/p. The recommended parameter set
described in Section 6.2 yields δ < 2−136.
Unbiased keys: Since our moduli are powers of 2 and as such non-prime,
there exists (negligibly small) exceptional sets for s and s′ such that the common
key is biased. The intuition is that if all coefficients of the polynomials in s or s′
are divisible by a high power of 2, the same property will hold for As or ATs′ ,
and their scaled versions. The following theorem however shows that outside
these sets, uniformity is attained.
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Theorem 2. Let Sbad denote the set of elements in R
l×1
q for which none of the
coefficients w satisfies gcd(w, q)|(q/p) and let S′bad denote the set of elements in
Rl×1q for which none of the coefficients w satisfies gcd(w, p)|(p/2). Let s,s′ ←
βµ(R
l×1
q ) and let A ← U(Rl×lq ) and determine k as follows:
1. b = bits(As + h, q, p)
2. k = bits(bT (s′ mod p) + h1, p, 1)
For s /∈ Sbad and s′ /∈ S′bad, k is distributed uniformly for A ← U(Rl×lq ). This
occurs with a probability Pr[s /∈ Sbad]Pr[s′ /∈ S′bad].
Proof. Note that the multiplication of a uniformly distributed coefficient of A,
by a coefficient w of s, is uniformly distributed in its p most significant bits if
gcd(w, q)|(q/p), which is equivalent to stating that bpw/qe is invertible in Zp.
The distribution of the coefficients of b = bits(As + h, q, p) is as follows:
since convolution of any distribution with a uniform distribution in Zp results
again in a uniform distribution in Zp, we need only one term of the summation
step to be uniform in its p most significant bits. Therefore, the coefficients of b
will be uniformly distributed if s /∈ Sbad.
Finally note that the distribution of k′ = bits(bT (s′ mod p) + h1, p, 1) is
uniform if b has a uniform distribution and if s′ /∈ s′bad. As above, a multiplication
of a uniformly distributed coefficient of b, with a coefficient w′ of s is uniformly
distributed in its most significant bit if gcd(w′, p)|(p/2). Therefore, k will be
uniform if the coefficients of b are uniformly distributed and if s′ /∈ S′bad. The
probability of a sampling s and s′ so that k has a uniform distribution is thus
Pr[s /∈ Sbad]Pr[s′ /∈ S′bad].
Since in our setting s,s′ are sampled from βµ(Rq), the coefficients are small
and thus the only sampleable vector in Sbad and S
′
bad is the all zero vector
which occurs with probability 2−1436. In the rest of the paper, we assume that
the secret vectors are not in the vector sets: s /∈ Sbad and s′ /∈ S′bad.
Security: The security of Saber.KE can be reduced to the decisional Mod-
LWR problem as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any adversary A, there exist three adversaries B0, B1 and B2
such that Advind-rndSaber.KE(A) 6 Advprggen()(B0) + Adv
mod-lwr
l,l,µ,q,p (B1) + Adv
mod-lwr
l+1,l,µ,q,p(B2),
if q/p 6 p/(2t).
Proof. The IND-RND security of our key exchange can be expressed as the
probability that an adversary A can distinguish between k and a uniformly
random key kˆ ← U(K), given the public information A,b,b′ and c. The proof
proceeds by a sequence of games Gi, where AdvGi(A) = |Pr[SA,i] − 1/2|, in
which SA,i is the event that the adversary guesses correctly in game Gi. The
sequence of games is depicted in Figure 2.
The first game G0 is the original game. In game G1, the public matrix is
no longer generated using the pseudorandom generator gen(), but is sampled
from a uniformly random distribution. An adversary that can distinguish these
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Game G0:
1. seedA ← U({0, 1}256)
2. A ← gen(seedA)
3. s,s′ ← βη(Rl×1q )
4. b = bits(
A · s + h, q, p)
5. b′ = bits(
AT · s′ + h, q, p)
6. v′ = bT · bits(s′, p, p)
+ h1
7. c = bits(v′, p − 1, t)
8. k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Game G1:
1.
2. A ← U(Rl×lq )
3. s,s′ ← βη(Rl×1q )
4. b = bits(
A · s + h, q, p)
5. b′ = bits(
AT · s′ + h, q, p)
6. v′ = bT · bits(s′, p, p)
+ h1
7. c = bits(v′, p − 1, t)
8. k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Game G2:
1.
2. A ← U(Rl×lq )
3. s′ ← βη(Rl×1q )
4. b ← U(Rl×1p )
5. b′ = bits(
AT · s′ + h, q, p)
6. v′ = bT · bits(s′, p, p)
+ h1
7. c = bits(v′, p − 1, t)
8. k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Game G3:
2. A ← U(Rl×lq )
3. s′ ← βη(Rl×1q )
4. b ← U(Rl×1p )
5. b′ = bits(
AT · s′ + h, q, p)
6. v′ = bT · bits(s′, p, p)
+ h1
7. c = bits(
v′, p − 1, 2p − q − 1)
8. k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Game G4:
2. A ← U(Rl×lq )
3. s′ ← βη(Rl×1q )
4. b ← U(Rl×1q )
5. b′ = bits(
AT · s′ + h, q, p)
6. v′ = bits(
bT · s′ + h1, q, p)
7. c = bits(
v′, q − 1, p − 1)
8. k′ = bits(v′, q, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Game G5:
2. A ← U(Rl×lq )
4. b ← U(Rl×1q )
5. b′ ← U(Rl×1p )
6. v′ ← U(Rl×1p )
7. c = bits(
v′, p − 1, p − 1)
8. k′ = bits(v′, p, 1)
9. kˆ ← U(R2)
10. u← U({0, 1})
11. if u = 0:
return(A,b, b′, c, k′)
12. else:
return(A,b, b′, c, kˆ)
Figure 2: Sequence of games that are used in the proof of Theorem 3
two games, can also distinguish the matrix generated through the pseudorandom
generator from a uniformly random matrix, and therefore |Pr[SA,0]−Pr[SA,1]| 6
Advprg
gen()(B0).
During the second game G2, the vector b is generated uniformly random,
so that (A,b) is a uniformly distributed sample, in contrast to the first game
G1, where (A,b) forms a Mod-LWR sample. An adversary that can distinguish
between game G1 and G2 has also solved the decisional Mod-LWR problem on
this sample, and therefore |Pr[SA,1]− Pr[SA,2]| 6 Advmod-lwrl,l,µ,q,p (B1).
In game G2, the number of bits dropped in the calculation of b
′ and c is
q − p and p− t− 1 respectively, which is reduced to q − p in game G3. If we
compare G3 to G2, since (q − p) 6 (p − t − 1), the number of dropped bits
is the same or less, and therefore the number of available bits to the adversary
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Algorithm 1: Saber.KeyGen()
1 seedA ← U({0, 1}256)
2 A ← gen(seedA) ∈ Rl×lq
3 s ← βµ(Rl×1q )
4 b = bits(As + h, q, p) ∈ Rl×1p
5 return (pk := (b, seedA), sk := s)
is at least the same. From this we conclude that G2 is at least as hard as G3:
∀A,∃A′ : AdvG2(A) 6 AdvG3(A′).
Up to game G3, the coefficients of the inputs for the generation of b
′ and c
are in Zq and Zp respectively. This is evened up to coefficients in Zq for all of
the calculations in game G4. Using s
′ instead of bits(s′, p, p) does not change
the result of the multiplication because µ < p. Since p | q, generating b from
U(Rl×1q ) instead of U(Rl×1p ) makes the advantage of the adversary in Game G4
at least as big as in game G3, as the adversary in Game G4 can easily calculate
the same value for c as in Game G3. Cutting off the last q − p bits of v′ does
not change the game since they are not used in the rest of the protocol. Thus
we can state: ∀A′,∃A′′ : AdvG3(A′) 6 AdvG4(A′′).
Analogous to game G2, b
′ and c are replaced by a uniform random value in
game G5, so that the Mod-LWR samples (A,b
′) and (b, v′), which share secret
key s′, are replaced by uniformly random variables. Therefore, an adversary that
can distinguish between these two games, can solve the corresponding Mod-LWR
decisional problem and thus |Pr[SA′′,4]− Pr[SA′′,5]| 6 Advmod-lwrl+1,l,µ,q,p(B2).
In the resulting game G5, the keys are independent of the values b, b
′ and v′.
Moreover, since v′ is uniformly distributed in Rl×1p , where q is a power of two,
and since k′ is generated as the first bit of v′, k′ is also uniformly distributed, and
therefore Pr[SA′′,5] = 1/2. Working backwards from the probability of success in
gameG5 to that in gameG0, and using the fact that AdvGi(A) = |Pr[SA,i]−1/2|,
gives the desired result.
4 CPA secure encryption
The key exchange scheme of the previous section can be transformed into a CPA
secure public-key encryption scheme Saber.PKE by using a similar transforma-
tion from Diffie-Hellman key exchange to ElGamal encryption, i.e. the messages
sent by Alice now define her public key, and the encryption simply consists of
an XOR with the common (pre)key.
The message space is M ∈ {0, 1}n and a message m ∈ M is represented
as an element in Rq with coefficients in {0, 1}. Algorithms 1 to 3 describe the
public-key encryption scheme Saber.PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec), where the setup
parameters are the same as in the key-exchange scheme described before. If the
optional parameter r is specified while calling Saber.ENC, it is used as a seed
to generate the secret vector s′.
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Algorithm 2: Saber.Enc(pk = (b, seedA),m ∈M; r)
1 A ← gen(seedA) ∈ Rl×lq
2 s′ ← βµ(Rl×1q )
3 b′ = bits(ATs′ + h, q, p) ∈ Rl×1p
4 v′ = bT bits(s′, p, p) + h1 ∈ Rp
5 cm = bits(v
′ + 2p−1m, p, t + 1) ∈ R2t
6 return c := (cm, b
′)
Algorithm 3: Saber.Dec(sk = s, cm, b
′)
1 v = b′T bits(s, p, p) + h1 ∈ Rp
2 m′ = bits(v − 2p−t−1cm + h2, p, 1) ∈ R2
3 return m′
Security and Correctness: It is easily seen that the security and cor-
rectness of the encryption scheme are equivalent to that of the key exchange
introduced in Section 3.
Theorem 4. For any adversary A against Saber.PKE, there exists an adversary
B against Saber.KE such that Advind-cpaSaber.PKE(A) = Adv
ind-rnd
Saber.KE(B). Furthermore,
Saber.PKE is (1− δ) correct if and only if Saber.KE is (1− δ) correct.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing the equivalence between Saber.PKE and
the combination of Saber.KE with a one time pad of the message m with k′KE.
Note that the most significant bit of each coefficient of v′ is equal to the cor-
responding (pre)key bits of k′ in Saber.KE. Therefore, in line 5 of the Alg. 2,
the addition is essentially a one time pad of the message bits m with the co-
efficients of the (pre)key k′ in the key exchange scheme (Protocol. 2). We can
therefore conclude that the security of our encryption equals the security of our
key exchange scheme for the same parameters. Similarly, it can be seen that
Saber.PKE is correct if the keys k and k′ are equal. Hence, the correctness of
the encryption scheme is equivalent to the correctness of the key exchange in
Protocol. 2.
5 CCA secure KEM
The CPA secure encryption scheme can be turned into a CCA secure KEM
Saber.KEM=(Encaps, Decaps) using an appropriate transformation. Recently,
several post-quantum versions [30,46,42,32] of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform
with corresponding security reductions have been developed. At this point, the
FO 6⊥ transformation in [30] with post-quantum reduction from Jiang et al. [32]
gives the tightest reduction for schemes with non-perfect correctness. However,
other transformations could be used to turn Saber.PKE into a CCA secure KEM.
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Algorithm 4: Saber.Encaps(pk = (b, seedA))
1 m← U({0, 1}256)
2 (Kˆ, r) = G(pk,m)
3 c = Saber.Enc(pk,m; r)
4 K = H(Kˆ, c)
5 return (c,K)
Algorithm 5: Saber.Decaps(sk = (s, z), pk = (b, seedA), c)
1 m′ = Saber.Dec(s, c)
2 (Kˆ′, r′) = G(pk,m′)
3 c′ = Saber.Enc(pk,m′; r′)
4 if c = c′ then
5 return K = H(Kˆ′, c)
6 else
7 return K = H(z, c)
Saber.KEM is described in detail in Algorithm 4 and 5. The functions G :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l×n and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n are hash functions,z is a secret
random seed used to return a pseudorandom response when the re-encryption
fails, and the Saber.Enc and Saber.Dec functions are from the CPA secure asym-
metric encryption described in Section 4.
Correctness: Following Hofheinz et al. [30], Saber.KEM is (1− δ) correct
if and only if Saber.PKE is (1− δ) correct, and thus also if and only if Saber.KE
is (1− δ) correct.
Security: By modeling the hash functions G and H as random oracles, a
lower bound on the CCA security can be proven. We use the security bounds
of Hofheinz et al. [30], which considers a KEM variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto
transform that can also handle a small failure probability δ of the encryption
scheme. This failure probability should be cryptographically negligibly small for
the security to hold. Using Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 from [30], we get the
following theorems for the security and correctness of our KEM in the random
oracle model:
Theorem 5 (ROM, Hofheinz et al. [30]). For a IND-CCA adversary B, making
at most qH and qG queries to respectively the random oracle G and H, and qD
queries to the decryption oracle, there exists an IND-CPA adversary A such that:
Advind-ccaSaber.KEM(B) 6 3Advind-cpaSaber.PKE(A) + qGδ +
2qG + qH + 1
2256
.
Jiang et al. [32] also provide a security reduction against a quantum adversary
in the quantum random oracle model from IND-CCA security to OW-CPA secu-
rity. IND-CPA with a sufficiently large message space implies OW-CPA [30,13].
Therefore, we can reduce the IND-CCA security of Saber.KEM to the IND.CPA
security of the underlying public key encryption:
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Theorem 6 (QROM, Jiang et al. [32]). For any IND-CCA quantum adversary
B, making at most qH and qG queries to respectively the random quantum oracle
G and H, and qD many (classical) queries to the decryption oracle, there exists
an adversary A such that:
Advind-ccaSaber.KEM(B) 6 2qH
1√
2256
+ 4qG
√
δ + 2(qG + qH)
√
Advind-cpaSaber.PKE(A)
Multi target protection: As described in [16], hashing the public key into
Kˆ has two beneficial effects: it makes sure that K depends on the input of both
parties, and it offers multi-target protection. In this scenario, the adversary uses
Grover’s algorithm to precompute an m that has a relatively high failure proba-
bility. Hashing pk into Kˆ ensures that an attacker is not able to use precomputed
‘weak’ values of m.
6 Security analysis and parameter selection
6.1 Security analysis
Our security analysis is similar to the one in ‘a New Hope’ [4]. The hardness of
Mod-LWR is analyzed as an LWE problem, since there are no known attacks
that make use of the Module or LWR structure. A set of l LWR samples given
by with A ← U(Rl×lq ) and s ← βµ(Rl×1q ), can be rewritten as an LWE problem
in the following way:(
A,
⌊p
q
(As mod q)
⌉
mod p
)
=
(
A,
p
q
(As mod q) + e mod p
)
.
We can lift this to a problem modulo q by multiplying by qp :
q
p
b = As +
q
p
e mod q ,
where q/pe is the random variable containing the error introduced by the round-
ing operation, of which the coefficients are discrete and nearly uniformly dis-
tributed in (−q/2p, q/2p].
BKW type of attacks [35] and linearization attacks [7] are not feasible, since
the number of samples is at most double the dimension of the lattice. Moreover,
the secret vectors s and s′ are dense enough to avoid the sparse secret attack
described by Albrecht [2]. As a result, we end up with two main type of attacks:
the primal and the dual attack, that make use of BKZ lattice reduction [20,43].
Weighted Primal Attack The primal attack constructs a lattice that has
a unique shortest vector that contains the noise e and the secret s. BKZ, with
block dimension b, can be used to find this unique solution. An LWE sample
(A,b = As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq can be transformed to the following lattice:
Λ = {v ∈ Zm+n+1 : (A|Im| − b)v = 0 mod q}, with dimension d = m + n + 1
and volume qm. The unique shortest vector in this lattice is v = (s,e, 1), and it
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has norm λ ≈√nσ2s +mσ2e . Using heuristic models, the primal attack succeeds
if [4]:
√
nσ2s +mσ
2
e <δ
2b−d−1Vol(Λ)
1
d
where: δ = ((pib)
1
d
b
2pie
)
1
2(b−1)
However, the vector v = (s,e, 1) is unbalanced since ||si|| is not necessarily equal
to ||ei||. In our case, ||si|| < ||ei||, which can be exploited by the lattice rescaling
method described by Bai et al. [9], and further analysed in [22]. Analogous to [4],
the primal attack is successful if the projected norm of the unique shortest vector
on the last b Gram-Schmidt vectors is shorter than the (d− b)th Gram-Schmidt
vector, or:
σs
√
b 6 δ2b−d−1
( q
α
)m
d
.
Weighted Dual Attack The dual attack tries to distinguish between an
LWE sample (A,b = As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq and a uniformly random sample by
finding a short vector (v,w) in the lattice Λ = {(x,y) ∈ Zm × Zn : ATx = y
mod q}. This short vector is used to compute a distinguisher z = vb. If b =
As+e, we can write z = vAs+ve = ws+ve, which is small and approximately
Gaussian distributed. If b is generated uniformly, z will also be uniform mod
q. Since in our case, ||si|| < ||ei||, we observe that the ws term will be smaller
than the ve term. The weighted attack [9,22] optimizes the shortest vector so
that these terms have a similar variance, by considering the weighted lattice
Λ′ = {(x,y ′) ∈ Zm × (α−1Z)n : (x, αy ′) ∈ Λ mod q}.
Following the strategy of [4], we can calculate the cost of the dual attack. The
statistical distance between a uniformly distributed z and a Gaussian distributed
z is bounded by  = 4exp(−2pi2τ2), where τ = ||u||σe/q . Since the key is
hashed, an advantage of  is not sufficient and must be repeated at least R =
max(1, 1/(20.2075b2)) times. The cost of the dual attack is thus equal to:
Costdual = CostBKZR = b2
cbR, .
6.2 Parameter selection
We use a python script to choose parameters q, p and t for optimum usage of
communication bandwidth, while achieving a quantum security level of 128 and
failure probability 2−128. Additional parameter sets are generated as Light and
Fire versions of the Saber.KEM, a light and paranoid version respectively.
We would like to remark that choosing p and q as primes facilitates the
use of NTT based polynomial multiplications [16,3]. However, rounding from
Rq to Rp introduces significant bias as p - q. Bogdanov et al. [15] proved the
pseudorandomness of the LWR problem for moduli p and q for general lattices
but left it as open problem for the ring version. However by choosing p and q
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as a power-of-two, we can be assured of the pseudorandomness, which we also
showed in Subsection. 3.
Sec Cat fail prob attack Classical Quantum pk (B) sk (B) ciphertext (B)
LightSaber-KEM: k = 2, n = 256, q = 213, p = 210, t = 22, µ = 10
1 2−120
primal 126 115
672 1568 736
dual 126 115
Saber-KEM: k = 3, n = 256, q = 213, p = 210, t = 23, µ = 8
3 2−136
primal 199 181
992 2304 1088
dual 198 180
FireSaber-KEM: k = 4, n = 256, q = 213, p = 210, t = 25, µ = 6
5 2−165
primal 270 246
1312 3040 1472
dual 270 245
Table 1: Security and correctness of Saber.KEM.
7 Implementation
In this section, we describe a constant-time software implementation of Saber.
Our implementation is relatively simpler than several existing lattice-based post-
quantum key exchange schemes [16,4,17]. This is primarily due to the underlying
LWR problem and our choice of power-of-two moduli. As the LWR problem in-
herently introduces errors, Saber can bypass error sampling operations unlike
other LWE-based schemes. Our choice of power-of-two moduli results in faster
arithmetic operations and does not require rejection sampling [4,16] for generat-
ing the random matrix A. In the remaining part of this section we describe the
building blocks that are used to realize an efficient implementation of Saber.
Symmetric primitives The hash functions G and H in the CCA-secure
Saber-KEM are implemented using SHA3-512 and SHA3-256 respectively, stan-
dardized in FIPS 202 [1]. For pseudorandom number generation, we use the
extendable output function SHAKE-128 [1]. On parallel platforms, such as In-
tel processors that support ‘single instruction multiple data’ (SIMD), one can
speedup pseudorandom number generation by using a vectorized implementa-
tion of SHAKE-128 and multiple seed values [16]. We decided to use SHAKE-128
serially to generate pseudorandom byte string of a required length from a given
seed. This is mainly because of the fact that on majority of resource-constrained
platforms (e.g., billions of IoT devices) SIMD would not be feasible, and hence
multiple execution of SHAKE-128 would worsen performance (time and energy)
because of the costly initialization operation [1] performed in each execution of
SHAKE-128. Note that, it is essential for the correctness of the KEM, that all
parties generate pseudorandomness in the same way.
Secret polynomial generation Saber requires sampling of secret polyno-
mials from an error distribution. In lattice-based public-key cryptography this
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error distribution is usually a discrete Gaussian distribution. A significant num-
ber of papers [27,44,39,18,25,26] improve the performance of discrete Gaussian
sampling. However, the implementation of a constant-time Gaussian sampler
turns out to be a challenging problem [38,34]. This motivated the authors of
NewHope [4] to use a centered binomial distribution instead of a Gaussian dis-
tribution. Sampling from a centered binomial distribution can be performed
easily [4] in constant time by comparing the Hamming weights of two random
integers of same length. Hence we use a centered binomial distribution βµ with
the parameter µ = 8 to sample the secret polynomials.
Matrix A generation Since A consists of 9 polynomials, each having 256
13-bit coefficients, we use SHAKE-128 to generate 9 · 256 · 13/8 = 3, 744 pseudo-
random bytes. Next we pack these bytes into the 13-bit coefficients of A. Note
that in our case no additional rejection sampling is required as in Kyber, due
to their use of a prime moduli. The rejection sampling wastes a portion of the
generated pseudorandom bytes.
Polynomial arithmetic Our protocols relies heavily on polynomial arith-
metic in the ring Rq with modulus q = 2
13 and the irreducible polynomial f(x) =
x256 + 1. While polynomial addition and subtraction are simple coefficient-wise
addition and subtraction operations, polynomial multiplication is a costly oper-
ation. An optimized polynomial multiplication routine is crucial for an efficient
implementation of Saber. Since q is not a prime, we cannot apply the Num-
ber Theoretic Transform (NTT) unlike the key exchange schemes such as ‘New
Hope’ [4], Kyber [16] etc. The next best alternative is the Karatsuba method
which does not require any special modulus. Hence we use the Karatsuba polyno-
mial multiplication method in Saber. The Karatsuba polynomial multiplication
has a higher asymptotic complexity of O(nlog2 3). Though we lose in asymptotic
time complexity, we gain in modular arithmetic since modular reduction comes
for free. Furthermore, we found that the Karatsuba polynomial multiplication
method is relatively easier to vectorize in modern Intel processors that support
AVX/AVX2 ‘single instruction multiple data’ (SIMD) instructions.
The Karatsuba multiplication method follows a top-down recursive approach:
a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication is split into three 128-coefficient poly-
nomial multiplications, next each 128-coefficient polynomial multiplication is
split into three 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications, and so on. After sev-
eral levels of recursive splitting, when the polynomial size becomes small enough,
i.e., reaches a particular threshold, a quadratic-complexity polynomial multipli-
cation such as the School-book method is used to compute the smallest polyno-
mial multiplications. If we set the threshold value to 16, then a 256-coefficient
Karatsuba polynomial multiplication calls the School-book polynomial multipli-
cation routine 81 times.
However, we can improve this by using the Toom-Cook polynomial multipli-
cation. The Toom-Cook method is a generalization of the Karatsuba method and
can be used to split a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication into seven 64-
coefficient polynomial multiplications. This is called four-way Toom-Cook mul-
tiplication. The smaller multiplications can be computed using the Karatsuba
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method as described above. Thus using the four-way Toom-Cook multiplication,
the total number of calls to the School-book multiplication routine reduces to
only 63 for a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication.
In the Toom-Cook multiplication the choice of the evaluation points affects
the computation time. Following [14], we choose the set of evaluation points to
be {0,±1/2,±1, 2,∞}. In the interpolation phase multiplications and divisions
by scalar constants are performed. Divisions by odd scalars are performed by
computing multiplications by their respective inverses. However, the inverse of
an even divisor does not exist when the modulus is a power of two, which is true
for Saber. For an even divisor we compute the division in two steps: first, we
multiply by the inverse of the odd factor, then we compute a true division (i.e.
right shifting) by the power-of-two factor since we know beforehand the division
has to be exact. In the four-way Toom-Cook multiplication, the maximum power-
of-two factor we have is 8, which could result in a loss of precision of 3 bits. Hence,
during the interpolation phase, we allow the intermediate coefficients to grow by
3 bits such that the extra bits can be used to calculate the divisions by 2, 4 and
8. Our choice of modulus q = 213 is especially helpful since we can use 16-bit
data variables (short integers in C) to store the 13-bit coefficients. The steps are
shown in Algorithm 6 in Appendix A.
AVX2 implementation of polynomial multiplication Starting from
Sandy Bridge, Intel provides AVX/AVX2 SIMD instructions that support com-
putation on 128/256-bit vectors. We utilize this feature to achieve fast polyno-
mial multiplication inspired by the software implementations of NTRU Prime [11]
and NTRU KEM [31]. In Algorithm 6 the interpolation phase is trivial to vec-
torize. However, the evaluation phase, where 64-coefficient polynomial multi-
plications are performed requires special care to take advantage of vectorized
instructions. We explain this below.
Assume that we want to compute 16 polynomial multiplications C0 · D0,
C1 · D1, to C15 · D15 where each polynomial has 16 coefficients. Also assume
that the polynomials are stored in two AVX2-arrays CAVX and DAVX as shown
in Figure 3. The i-th coefficients of all Cj (and Dj) polynomials reside in the
same AVX2 vectors. With such an arrangement it is easy to compute the 16
polynomial multiplications in a batch by multiplying the elements of CAVX and
DAVX . We design the polynomial multiplier routine with the aim to obtain such
an arrangement of coefficients during the threshold School-book multiplications.
This is explained below.
The seven 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications in Algorithm 6 require 63
School-book multiplications of 16-coefficient polynomials. Since a 16-coefficient
0 [0]D [0]1D D [0]15
[15]D10 [15]D [15]15D
CAVX [0]
CAVX [15]
DAVX [0]
DAVX [15]
[0]1 [0]15
[15]10 [15] [15]15
0 [0]C C C
CCC
Figure 3: Arrangement of coefficients for batch polynomial multiplication
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polynomial fits in an AVX2 vector, the 63 School-book multiplications can be
computed in 4 batches using vectorized instructions. However, the batching is not
trivial to implement. In the Karatsuba recursion, we do not immediately com-
pute a School-book multiplication every time the recursion reaches the threshold
condition. Instead, a lazy approach is adapted. We keep two ‘buckets’ each of
which is an array of 16 AVX2 vectors. These buckets are gradually filled with the
16-coefficient polynomials that are the multiplicands of the School-book multi-
plications. Once the buckets are full, each of them can be viewed as a 16 × 16
matrix, containing 256 coefficients. Next we transpose the matrices using a se-
quence of AVX2 operations to reach the arrangement as shown in Figure 3. Now
a batch multiplication is performed. The result is a collection of 31 vectors. This
is again transposed to get the result of each 16-coefficient polynomial multipli-
cation in two vectors. This lazy approach requires a bookkeeping which has a
small overhead.
Table 2: Cycle count of the building blocks used in Saber and Kyber
Scheme Operation Cycles
Saber Toom-Cook polynomial multiplication 3,439
AVX2 optimized Sampling secret polynomial vector 13,656
Generating random matrix A (serial SHAKE-128) 40,100
Generating random matrix A (parallel SHAKE-128)† 25,300
Saber Toom-Cook polynomial multiplication 20,520
C Sampling secret polynomial vector 13,656
Generating random matrix A 54,707
Kyber NTT 560
AVX2 + assembly Inverse NTT 489
optimized Sampling secret/error polynomial vector 10,545
Generating random matrix A (parallel SHAKE-128) 32,601
Kyber NTT 16,431
C Inverse NTT 13,098
Sampling secret/error polynomial vector 10,545
Generating random matrix A 69,620
‡ Not used in Saber, see Sec. 7
8 Results
In Table 3, we compare our software implementation of Saber with software im-
plementations of other lattice based post-quantum key exchange and encryption
schemes. We compiled the Saber software using gcc-7.1 with optimization flags
-O3 and measured computation time using a single core of a Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6600U processor running at 2.60GHz with hyper-threading, Turbo-Boost, and
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multi-core support disabled on a Dell Latitude E7470 laptop with Ubuntu 16.04
operating system.
We remark that a totally fair comparison between the listed schemes and
their software implementations is not possible since they are based on different
hard problems, offer different levels of post-quantum security, implemented with
different levels of optimizations and benchmarked on different platforms. Never-
theless, it is clear from the table that Saber is highly efficient both in terms of
bandwidth and computation time.
The implementations of Saber and Kyber use similar building blocks namely
polynomial multiplication, generation of random matrix A, sampling of small
secret (and error) polynomials and standard symmetric-key primitives for CCA
transformations. In Table 2, we compare the performances of these building
blocks excluding the symmetric-key primitives. Our Toom-Cook multiplication
requires only 3,439 cycles. On the other hand, Kyber uses highly AVX-optimized
NTT for polynomial multiplications. Furthermore, Kyber spends much less cy-
cles in polynomial multiplications by generating the matrix A in the NTT domain
directly and by keeping the secret polynomials in the NTT domain.
Saber does not require sampling of error polynomials, thus saving in com-
putation time and entropy usage. As already described in Section 7 generating
the random matrix A is faster in Saber (when same pseudorandom number gen-
erator is used) since rejection sampling is not performed, resulting in optimal
usage of random numbers. Though in this paper we consider only software im-
plementation on high-end Intel processors, we would like to remark that random
number generation is very expensive on resource-constrained platforms. When
we compare the high-level C implementations of Saber and Kyber, we see that
Saber performs better than Kyber.
Finally note that at the expense of either using larger public keys, or caching
the decompressed matrix A, the implementation would run at least 25% faster.
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Table 3: Performance and comparison of lattice-based KEMs and public-key encryption schemes.
Cycles for key generation, encapsulation/encryption, and decapsulation/decryption are represented
by K, E, and D respectively in the 5th column. Sizes of secret key (sk), public key (pk) and
ciphertext (c) are reported in the last column. Constant-time implementations are marked with Xin
the column ct?. Performances are measured on the platform specified in the beginning of this section
if not indicated otherwise.
Scheme Problem Security ct? Cycles Bytes
Passively secure KEMs
NewHope [4] Ring-LWE 255 X K: 88,920† sk: 1,792
AVX2 optimized E: 110,986† pk: 1,824
D: 19,422† c: 2,048
Frodo [17] LWE 130 X K: 2,938,000? sk: 11,280
E: 3,484,000? pk: 11,296
D: 338,000? c: 11,288
CCA-secure KEMs
NTRU Prime [11] NTRU 129 X K: 6,115,384⊗ sk: 1,600
E: 59,600⊗ pk: 1,218
D: 97,452⊗ c: 1,047
NTRU KEM [31] NTRU 123 X K: 307,914⊥ sk: 1,422
AVX2 optimized E: 48,646⊥ pk: 1,140
D: 67,338⊥ c: 1,281
spLWE-KEM [21] spLWE 128 ? K: 336,700‡ sk: ?
E: 813,800‡ pk: ?
D: 785,200‡ c: 804
Kyber [16] Module-LWE 161 X K: 92,461 sk: 2400
AVX2 + assembly E: 120,280 pk: 1088
optimized D: 113,718 c: 1152
Kyber [16] Module-LWE 161 X K: 251,856 sk: 2400
C implementation E: 336,112 pk: 1088
D: 435,836 c: 1152
Saber Module-LWR 180 X K: 101,138 sk: 2,304
AVX2 optimized E: 125,392 pk: 992
D: 129,138 c: 1,088
Saber Module-LWR 180 X K: 190,420 sk: 2,304
C implementation E: 279,291 pk: 992
D: 306,346 c: 1,088
CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes
NTRUEncrypt [28] NTRU 159 × K: 1,194,816† sk: 1120
E: 57,440† pk: 1,027
D: 110,604† c: 980
Lizard [22] LWE,LWR 128 × K: 97,573,000† sk: 466,944•
E: 35,050† pk: 2,031,616•
D: 80,840† c: 1,072
† Compiled using gcc-4.9.2 and benchmarked on Intel Core i7-4770K (Haswell) computer
? Benchmarked on a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon E5 (Sandy Bridge) with hyperthreading enabled.
⊗ Benchmarked on an Intel Haswell processor.
‡ Benchmarked on a Macbook Pro PC with 2.6GHz Intel Core i5.
• Following the explanation provided in [16].
⊥ Benchmarked on an Intel i7-Haswell, 3.5GHz processor.
20
9 Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the Research Council KU Leuven: C16/15/058.
In addition, this work was supported by the European Commission through the
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No
H2020-ICT-2014-645622 PQCRYPTO, H2020-ICT-2014-644209 HEAT, Cathe-
dral ERC Advanced Grant 695305 and in part by Flemish Government, by the
Hercules Foundation AKUL/11/19.
References
1. 2015., National Institute of Standards and Technology.: SHA-3 standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions. FIPS PUB 202 (2015)
2. Albrecht, M.R.: On dual lattice attacks against small-secret lwe and parameter
choices in helib and seal. In: EUROCRYPT 2017. pp. 103–129 (2017), https:
//doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_4
3. Alkim, E., Ducas, L., Po¨ppelmann, T., Schwabe, P.: NewHope without reconcili-
ation (2016), http://cryptojedi.org/papers/#newhopesimple
4. Alkim, E., Ducas, L., Po¨ppelmann, T., Schwabe, P.: Post-quantum key exchange
– a new hope. In: USENIX Security 2016 (2016)
5. Alperin-Sheriff, J., Apon, D.: Dimension-preserving reductions from lwe to lwr.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/589 (2016)
6. Alwen, J., Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K., Wichs, D.: Learning with rounding, revisited -
new reduction, properties and applications. In: CRYPTO 2013. pp. 57–74 (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4
7. Arora, S., Ge, R.: New algorithms for learning in presence of errors. In: Aceto,
L., Henzinger, M., Sgall, J. (eds.) ICALP 2011. pp. 403–415 (2011), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-22006-7_34
8. Baan, H., Bhattacharaya, S., Garcia-Morchon, O., Rietman, R., Tolhuizen, L.,
Torre-Arce, J.L., Zhang, Z.: Round2: Kem and pke based on glwr. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2017/1183 (2017), https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1183
9. Bai, S., Galbraith, S.D.: Lattice Decoding Attacks on Binary LWE, pp. 322–337.
Springer International Publishing, Cham (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
3-319-08344-5_21
10. Banerjee, A., Peikert, C., Rosen, A.: Pseudorandom functions and lattices. In:
EUROCRYPT 2012. pp. 719–737 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-
29011-4_42
11. Bernstein, D.J., Chuengsatiansup, C., Lange, T., van Vredendaal, C.: Ntru prime:
reducing attack surface at low cost. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/461
(2016), http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/461
12. Bhattacharya, S., Garcia-Morchon, O., Rietman, R., Tolhuizen, L.: spkex: An op-
timized lattice-based key exchange. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/709
(2017), http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/709
13. Birkett, J., Dent, A.W.: Relations among notions of plaintext awareness. In: PKC
2008. pp. 47–64 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78440-1_4
14. Bodrato, M., Zanoni, A.: Integer and polynomial multiplication: Towards optimal
toom-cook matrices. In: ISSAC ’07. pp. 17–24. ACM (2007), http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/1277548.1277552
21
15. Bogdanov, A., Guo, S., Masny, D., Richelson, S., Rosen, A.: On the hardness of
learning with rounding over small modulus. In: 13th International Conference on
Theory of Cryptography. pp. 209–224 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
662-49096-9_9
16. Bos, J., Ducas, L., Kiltz, E., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V., Schanck, J.M.,
Schwabe, P., Stehle´, D.: Crystals – kyber: a cca-secure module-lattice-based kem.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/634 (2017), http://eprint.iacr.org/
2017/634
17. Bos, J.W., Costello, C., Ducas, L., Mironov, I., Naehrig, M., Nikolaenko, V.,
Raghunathan, A., Stebila, D.: Frodo: Take off the ring! practical, quantum-
secure key exchange from LWE. In: CCS 2016. pp. 1006–1018. ACM (2016),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2976749.2978425
18. Buchmann, J., Cabarcas, D., Go¨pfert, F., Hu¨lsing, A., Weiden, P.: Discrete ziggu-
rat: A time-memory trade-off for sampling from a gaussian distribution over the
integers. In: Revised Selected Papers on Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC
2013 - Volume 8282. pp. 402–417. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., New York, NY,
USA (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43414-7_20
19. Chen, L., Jordan, S.P., Liu, Y.K., Moody, D., Peralta, R.C., Perlner, R.A., Smith-
Tone, D.C.: Report on post-quantum cryptography. In: NIST Internal Report (NI-
STIR) - 8105 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8105
20. Chen, Y., Nguyen, P.Q.: Bkz 2.0: Better lattice security estimates. In: ASIACRYPT
2011 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_1
21. Cheon, J.H., Han, K., Kim, J., Lee, C., Son, Y.: A practical post-quantum public-
key cryptosystem based on splwe. In: ICISC 2016. pp. 51–74 (2017), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-53177-9_3
22. Cheon, J.H., Kim, D., Lee, J., Song, Y.: Lizard: Cut off the tail! practical post-
quantum public-key encryption from lwe and lwr. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Re-
port 2016/1126 (2016), http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1126
23. Diffie, W., Hellman, M.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory 22(6), 644–654 (Nov 1976)
24. Ding, J.: New cryptographic constructions using generalized learning with errors
problem. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/387 (2012), http://eprint.
iacr.org/2012/387
25. Ducas, L., Durmus, A., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V.: Lattice signatures and
bimodal gaussians. In: Canetti, R., Garay, J.A. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO 2013: 33rd Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA,
August 18-22, 2013. Proceedings, Part I, pp. 40–56. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_3
26. Ducas, L., Nguyen, P.Q.: Faster gaussian lattice sampling using lazy floating-point
arithmetic. In: Wang, X., Sako, K. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT
2012: 18th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology
and Information Security, Beijing, China, December 2-6, 2012. Proceedings, pp.
415–432. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2012), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_26
27. Dwarakanath, N.C., Galbraith, S.D.: Sampling from discrete gaussians for lattice-
based cryptography on a constrained device. Applicable Algebra in Engineering,
Communication and Computing 25(3), 159–180 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/s00200-014-0218-3
28. Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., Schanck, J.M., Silverman, J.H., Whyte, W., Zhang, Z.:
Choosing parameters for ntruencrypt. In: CT-RSA 2017. pp. 3–18 (2017), https:
//doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_1
22
29. Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., Silverman, J.H.: Ntru: A ring-based public key cryptosys-
tem. In: AANTS-III (1998), https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054868
30. Hofheinz, D., Ho¨velmanns, K., Kiltz, E.: A modular analysis of the fujisaki-
okamoto transformation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/604 (2017),
http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/604
31. H ulsing, A., Rijneveld, J., Schanck, J.M., Schwabe, P.: High-speed key encap-
sulation from ntru. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/667 (2017), http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2017/667
32. Jiang, H., Zhang, Z., Chen, L., Wang, H., Ma, Z.: Post-quantum ind-cca-secure
kem without additional hash. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/1096 (2017),
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1096
33. Jin, Z., Zhao, Y.: Optimal key consensus in presence of noise. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2017/1058 (2017), https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1058
34. Karmakar, A., Roy, S.S., Reparaz, O., Vercauteren, F., Verbauwhede, I.: Constant-
time discrete gaussian sampling. IEEE Transactions on Computers pp. 1–1 (2018)
35. Kirchner, P., Fouque, P.: An improved BKW algorithm for LWE with applications
to cryptography and lattices. In: CRYPTO 2015. pp. 43–62 (2015), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_3
36. Langlois, A., Stehle´, D.: Worst-case to average-case reductions for module lattices.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography 75(3), 565–599 (Jun 2015), https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10623-014-9938-4
37. Lyubashevsky, V., Peikert, C., Regev, O.: On ideal lattices and learning with er-
rors over rings. In: EUROCRYPT 2010 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
3-642-13190-5_1
38. Micciancio, D., Walter, M.: Gaussian sampling over the integers: Efficient, generic,
constant-time. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/259 (2017), http://
eprint.iacr.org/2017/259
39. Peikert, C.: An efficient and parallel gaussian sampler for lattices. In: Rabin, T.
(ed.) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010: 30th Annual Cryptology Con-
ference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. Proceedings, pp. 80–97.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-642-14623-7_5
40. Peikert, C.: Lattice cryptography for the internet. In: Mosca, M. (ed.) PQCrypto
2014 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11659-4_12
41. Regev, O.: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. In: STOC ’05. pp. 84–93. ACM (2005), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
1060590.1060603
42. Saito, T., Xagawa, K., Yamakawa, T.: Tightly-secure key-encapsulation mecha-
nism in the quantum random oracle model. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2017/1005 (2017), https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1005
43. Schnorr, C.P., Euchner, M.: Lattice basis reduction: Improved practical algorithms
and solving subset sum problems. Mathematical Programming (1994), https://
doi.org/10.1007/BF01581144
44. Sinha Roy, S., Vercauteren, F., Verbauwhede, I.: High precision discrete gaussian
sampling on fpgas. In: Lange, T., Lauter, K., Lisoneˇk, P. (eds.) Selected Areas in
Cryptography – SAC 2013: 20th International Conference, Burnaby, BC, Canada,
August 14-16, 2013, Revised Selected Papers. pp. 383–401. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43414-
7_19
23
45. Stehle´, D., Steinfeld, R.: Making ntru as secure as worst-case problems over ideal
lattices. In: EUROCRYPT 2011 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-
20465-4_4
46. Targhi, E.E., Unruh, D.: Post-quantum security of the fujisaki-okamoto and oaep
transforms. In: Theory of Cryptography: 14th International Conference (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_8
A Toom-Cook-4 polynomial multiplication.
Here we describe the Toom-Cook polynomial multiplication used in our imple-
mentation.
Algorithm 6: Toom-Cook Algorithm
Input: Two polynomials A(x) and B(x)of degree n = 256
Output: C(x) = A(x) ∗ b(x)
// Splitting A(x) into four polynomials of size 64
1 A(y) = A3 · y3 +A2 · y2 +A1 · y +A0 where y = x64
// Splitting B(x) into four polynomials of size 64
2 B(y) = B3 · y3 +B2 · y2 +B1 · y +B0
// Evaluation of the polynomials at y = {0,±1,± 1
2
, 2,∞}. These
multiplications are computed using Karatsuba
3 w1 = A(∞) ∗B(∞) = A3 ∗B3
4 w2 = A(2) ∗B(2) = (A0 + 2 ·A1 + 4 ·A2 + 8 ·A3) ∗ (B0 + 2 ·B1 + 4 ·B2 + 8 ·B3)
5 w3 = A(1) ∗B(1) = (A0 +A1 +A2 +A3) ∗ (B0 +B1 +B2 +B3)
6 w4 = A(−1) ∗B(−1) = (A0 −A1 +A2 −A3) ∗ (B0 −B1 +B2 −B3)
7 w5 = A(
1
2
) ∗B( 1
2
) = (8 ·A0 + 4 ·A1 + 2 ·A2 +A3) ∗ (8 ·B0 + 4 ·B1 + 2 ·B2 +B3)
8 w6 = A(
−1
2
)∗B(−1
2
) = (8 ·A0−4 ·A1 + 2 ·A2−A3)∗ (8 ·B0−4 ·B1 + 2 ·B2−B3)
9 w7 = A(0) ∗B(0) = A0 ∗B0
// Interpolation
10 w2 = w2 + w5
11 w6 = w6 − w5
12 w4 = (w4 − w3)/2
13 w5 = w5 − w1 − 64 · w7
14 w3 = w3 + w4
15 w5 = 2 · w5 + w6
16 w2 = w2 − 65 · w3
17 w3 = w3 − w7 − w1
18 w2 = w2 + 45 · w3
19 w5 = (w5 − 8 · w3)/24
20 w6 = w6 + w2
21 w2 = (w2 + 16 · w4)/18
22 w3 = w3 − w5
23 w4 = −(w4 + w2)
24 w6 = (30 · w2 − w6)/60
25 w2 = w2 − w6
26 return w1 · y6 + w2 · y5 + w3 · y4 + w4 · y3 + w5 · y2 + w6 · y + w7;
24
